Even though the forward-spot relationship in currency markets is very important for policy makers and for corporate and investment managers, it remains a theoretical and empirical puzzle. In theory the forward rate should be an unbiased forecast of the future spot rate, but this hypothesis has little empirical support. For the currencies of the nine major industrialized countries, this paper documents that in spite of the very high trading volumes in currency markets, consistent with evidence for other asset markets, revisions in the forward rate forecasts of the future spot exchange rate reflect systematic pessimism and under-reaction to new information (JEL: F31, G14, F47, G15).
I. Introduction
The relation between forward and spot rates in foreign exchange markets remains very interesting, not only to policy makers but also to corporate and investment managers. Many investment, hedging, and macroeconomic decisions are influenced and determined by the nature of this relationship (the effectiveness of the forward rate as a forecast of the future spot rate). However, the currency market forward-spot 243 Behavioral Biases in Forward Rates [1997] ). Even though trading volumes in currency markets are much higher, systematic deviations from rationality have also been documented in these markets (Lewis, [1989] ). Are foreign exchange markets characterized by the behavioral biases seen in equity markets?
This paper examines the ability of currency forward rates to forecast future spot rate changes and to revise such forecasts with the availability of updated information. In particular, this paper examines if revisions in the forward rate forecasts of future spot currency rates reflect systematic over-or under-reaction and if they are systematically pessimistic or optimistic? We find that the nine major currencies examined share similar patterns in the forecast revision processes and we document significant systematic under-reaction to new information and consistent pessimism in forecast revisions.
Next we review the literature on biases in forward rates, on investor belief revisions, and on the common methodologies for testing forward rates as unbiased predictors of future spot rates. Following that we describe the data and methodology used in this paper, present the empirical results, and the final section concludes.
II. Rationality and Efficiency in Asset Markets
Previous tests of rationality of forward expectations mostly focus on the one-period ahead forecasts. In this paper we note that investors and markets continually revise their expectations with new information. However, as the burgeoning literature on over-and under-reaction in equity markets notes, such revisions may be influenced by behavioral patterns that allow prices to deviate from market rationality and efficiency (Abel [2002] , Barberis et al. [1998] ). As this literature notes, costly and asymmetric information and limitations in arbitrage can lead to systematic deviations from rational expectations and to biased forecasts. Fortunately, recent literature on asset price behavior has started to explain how the intersection of psychology and decision science can illuminate systematic behavioral patterns observed in asset markets.
A. Theoretical Bases for Behavioral Biases
Market participants generally have limited ability to assess and process information and reflect many behavioral biases including overconfidence (e.g., Daniel and Titman, [1999] ). Overconfidence among market participants has two effects, i.e., investor's overweight prior beliefs and underweight new information (Barberis et al. [1998] ). Recent work by Cecchetti et al. (2000) develops a model that explains why investors may be systematically pessimistic as they violate rational expectations by being unusually risk averse. Barberis et al. (1998) develop a theoretical model that explains short horizon under-reaction and long horizon over-reaction based on investors being subject to conservatism and representativeness -two well-known cognitive biases. With conservatism, an investor sticks to prior beliefs more strongly that is warranted while with representativeness investors finds patterns in data too readily. The interaction of these two behavioral biases makes investors under-react to information that is preceded by an inadequate quantity of similar information and investors over-react to information preceded by large amounts of similar information.
B. Empirical Evidence of Behavioral Biases in Asset Markets
The empirical literature documents these theoretical predictions of systematic deviations from rational expectations. Aggarwal, Mohanty, and Song (1995) document systematic deviations from rationality for professional forecasts of a number of major macroeconomic series. Similar results are found for revisions among economic forecasters (Ghosh [1997] ). Ashiya and Doi (2001) show extensive herding among Japanese institutional forecasters. Others have noted systematic pessimism in market responses to new information in forecasts of inflation (Ball and Croushore [2001] ). Karamanou and Raedy (2000) , and Amir and Ganzach (1998) show that security analysts under-react to new information and Jackson and Johnson (2006) show a generalized pattern of under-reaction in equity markets.
A recent body of equity markets literature has started to explore systematically the reasons for such deviations from rationality and efficiency. This literature has noted that financial markets are not frictionless (e.g., transactions and information costs) and face limits on the nature and extent of arbitrage (e.g., Schleifer and Vishny [1997] ). For example, arbitrage requires capital and is usually risky. Because of the skill and connections required, arbitrage may be limited by agency problems between specialized skilled arbitrageurs and other investors. In addition to limited arbitrage, market prices may deviate from rational efficient levels due to positive feedback trading as informed investors try to take advantage of the uninformed (De Long et al. [1990] ). Indeed, investors and mutual fund managers have been shown to engage in herding behavior (e.g., Wermers [1999] , Nofsinger and Sias [1999] ).
In addition to institutional factors, there are systematic behavioral biases that contribute to deviations from rational efficient markets. These systematic deviations from rationality and efficiency seem to reflect well-documented behavioral patterns among investors and other economic agents (Barberis et al. [1998 ], Hirshleifer [2001 ). Shiller (2002) assesses and summarizes much of this literature on the behavioral biases in investor decisions.
Several recent papers (Lakonishok et al. [1994] , La Porta [1996] ) that study stock market price behavior contend that investors irrationally extrapolate recent prices and thus make wrong forecasts. For example, investors observe abnormal price movement and erroneously project that the trend is to continue. Abel (2002) shows that systematic pessimism and doubt are consistent with observed equity market behavior. There is evidence among investors that they are prone to pessimism and over-reaction at long horizons and under-reaction at short horizons (Poteshman [2001] , Daniel et al. [1998] ). These systematic deviations from rationality and efficiency seem to reflect well-documented behavioral patterns among investors and other economic agents (Barberis et al. [1998 ], Hirshleifer [2001 ).
C. Evidence of Behavioral Biases in Currency Markets
Even though trading volumes in currency markets are much higher than in equity markets, deviations from rationality have been documented in these markets as well (DeGrauwe et al. [2005] ; Frankel and Froot [1986] ; Levich [1979] ; Ashiya [2002] ; Villanueva [2005] ). Lewis (1989) suggests that such deviations from rationality may be due to a combination of Bayesian learning and risk premia. More specifically, Bekaert and Hodrick (2001) summarize three potential reasons for the rejection of forward rate as an unbiased future spot rate. The first is that the expectation hypothesis (EH) is based on the assumption of rational expectations and unlimited arbitrage. The second is the presence of time-varying risk premiums. The third is that the tests themselves may lead to false rejections because of poor properties in finite samples. So, forward rates may not be rational forecasts of future spot rates and it may be difficult to assess sources of such bias.
Nevertheless, like other asset markets, currency markets may also be subject to speculative excesses. Frankel and Froot (1990) contend that the mid 1980s over-valuation of the U.S. dollar is an example of a speculative bubble. DeGrauwe et al. (2005) suggest that bias in forward exchange rates may result from behavioral bubbles that arise when investors use trading rules that have been profitable in prior periods. Another factor contributing to deviations from rationality in currency markets is intervention by central banks, a powerful well informed group of market participants whose goals may deviate greatly from economic profit maximization (e.g., Bonser-Neal [1996] , Humpage [1987] ). Bacchetta and Wincoop (2005) develop a model based on costly information and rational inattention in another theoretical attempt to explain forward exchange rate biases. However, in spite of these recent models that try to explain forward exchange rate biases, there is little empirical literature on behavioral biases in currency markets and there does not seem to be any empirical literature on optimism and pessimism in foreign exchange forward markets.
As this brief literature review indicates, it has been widely documented that forward rates reflect systematic biases as forecasts of future spot rates. However, the sources of this bias are still unclear. In this paper we not only test the rationality of the forward rate as a forecast of the future spot rate, but we also examine how new information is incorporated in changes in the forward rate as the forecast period shortens and new information becomes available. We test if the resulting revisions in the forward rate forecast of the future spot rate are characterized by systematic behavioral biases of under/over reaction and optimism and pessimism.
Specifically, in this paper, we investigate the nature of the revision process reflected in how the forward exchange rate changes as a forecast of a future spot rate (as reflected in the differences between six month and three month forward rates as forecasts of the same future spot rate). We examine if the biases and deviations from rationality and efficiency noted in studies of other asset markets also hold for the much more liquid foreign exchange market. In investigating revisions in forward rates as forecasts of future spot rates, we separate the effects of systematic optimism/pessimism from the effects of under/over-reaction to new information. Engel (1996) provides a comprehensive review of the literature on spot and forward exchange rate relationships. As Engel (1996) notes, with 247 Behavioral Biases in Forward Rates the assumption of rationality and risk neutrality, the forward exchange rate unbiasness is expressed as:
III. Research Design and Data

A. Biased Forward Exchange Rates and Forecast Revisions Forward Rates as Unbiased Predictors of Future Spot Rates
which states the expected spot rate at t+1 conditional on the information available at time t should be the same as the forward rate at time t. The hypothesis is usually expressed as the levels relationship:
where ζ t +1 is a random variable (rational expectations forecast error)
Two different regression equations have generally been used to test the hypothesis of unbiasness of forward exchange rates. The first one is the "levels regression":
where the null hypothesis requires that μ = 0, β f = 1 and E t [μ t+1 ] = 0. Studies using equation (2) 
where the null hypothesis requires that μ* = 0, α s =1, and E t [μ* t+1 ] = 0. Empirical results based on the differences equation strongly reject the hypothesis of unbiased forward exchange rate forecast. The typical estimates of α s across a wide range of currencies and sampling frequencies are significantly negative. This result is often referred to as the forward discount anomaly, or forward discount puzzle. Zivot (2000) argues that the hypothesis of unbiased forward exchange rates requires not only that S t+1 and f t be cointegrated and that the cointegrating vector be (1,-1), but also that S t and f t be cointegrated and the cointegrating vector be (1,-1). Zivot (2000) investigates the relationship between the two models of cointegration and argues that the simple model of cointegration between S t and f t captures the stylized facts of typical exchange rate data better than the simple model of cointegration between S t+1 and f t and so serves as a natural starting point for the analysis of exchange rate behavior. This conclusion implies that standard VAR methods are not appropriate for modeling the cointegrating vector of (S t+1 , f t ), and the use of such methods can lead to erroneous inferences regarding the unbiasness hypothesis regarding the forward rate as a forecast of the future spot rate. Zivot (2000) confirms the contention in Baillie (1989) , who points out VAR is misspecified considering the cointegration of spot rate and forward rate, and an error correction term needs to be added.
Test for Rationality of Forward Rates as Spot Rate Forecasts
MacDonald and Taylor (1992) review the literature on exchange rate determination and tests of the rationality of forward expectations. Expectations have been measured directly based on surveys (Cavaglia et al. [1994] ) or indirectly based on an asset pricing model. Generally the traditional orthogonality test for rationality is tested in the regression:
where the left-hand side is the exchange rate forecast error. The null hypothesis of rational expectations implies that α 1 = 0 and β 1 = 0. In Cavaglia et al. (1994) , the orthogonality regression was fitted via OLS for each currency and for each forecast horizon, standard errors are corrected to allow for a k-1 order moving average. The findings reject the forward exchange rate as an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate, and the bias in the forward rate is attributed to both irrational expectations and a risk premium. Froot and Frankel (1989) analyze survey data on exchange rate expectations and show that not all the biases in the forward discount are due to time varying risk premia and at least some bias may be attributable to systematic expectational errors in that changes in the forward discount reflect changes in expected depreciation with the market risk premium constant. In this paper we not only test the rationality of the forward rate as a forecast of the future spot rate, but we also examine how new information is incorporated in changes in the forward rate as the forecast period shortens and new information becomes available. We test if these revisions in the forward rate forecast of the future spot rate are characterized by systematic behavioral biases of under/overreaction and optimism and pessimism.
B. Rationality, Under-or Over-Reaction and Pessimism vs. Optimism
Assume at time t-1, market participants form the forecast of the future spot rate at times t and t+1, which are the forward rates t-1 F t and t-1 F t+1 respectively. At time t, market participants learn that their prior expectation (formed at t-1) is not accurate and they use the forecast error as part of the new information to revise their forecast for t+1. Market participants revise their forecast of the future spot rate for time t+1 (originally formed at time t-1, and reflected in the forward rate t-1 F t+1 ), and now form a new expectation for the spot rate at t+1, the forward rate t F t+1 . This paper focuses on the relationship between the forecast revision, t F t+1 -t-1 F t+1 and the forecast error, t F t+1 -S t+1 . Before investigating the belief revision process, in this paper we check the stationarity of each time series.
Consider two behavioral factors that influence a forecast and revisions to such forecasts with the arrival of new information: optimism versus pessimism and over-reaction versus under-reaction. Forecasters are optimistic when their forecast errors tend to be positive and are pessimistic when the errors are negative. If forecasters over-react to new information, then their forecast revisions are positive and their errors are negative or when their revisions are negative and their errors are positive. In other words, forecasters overreact when their revisions and errors are of the opposite signs. Similarly, they under-react when their revisions and errors are of the same sign. In order to distinguish between the effects of optimism/pessimism from the effects of over/under reaction more formally, forecast errors are regressed on forecast revisions. Assume forecast error for time t is FE t = t F t+1 -S t+1 , and the forecast revision for time t is FR t = t-1 F t+1 -t F t+1 , the regression is:
The null hypothesis of rationality is α = β = 0. Positive α implies optimism, while negative α implies pessimism. Positive β implies over-reaction and negative β implies under-reaction to new information. A finding of negative beta would be consistent with the widely replicated and accepted bias of conservatism (Shiller [2002] ). Tables 1a 1. We follow Easterwood and Nutt (1999) in attempting to examine whether forward foreign exchange markets are systematic optimistic or systematic pessimistic.
2. One possible shortcoming of this regression is that the independent variable may contain both the expected and unexpected components of the spot rate change. To single out the effect of the unexpected change in spot rate, one additional regression is used to supplement the above forecast regression. In this additional regression, the independent variable is changed to reflect the unexpected change in the prior spot rates UPCH t-1 , which is PSCH t-1 minus the average change of the prior 3-month spot rates. However, this change does not result in any changes in the conclusions and the results are not reported here but are available from the authors. and 1b report the descriptive statistics for FE and FR for each currency. While the mean forecast errors are almost uniformly negative, there do not seem to be any major surprises in these tables.
Impact of Prior Period Changes
Under-or Over-reaction: In order to assess systematic over-or under-reaction to information in forward rates as forecasts of future spot rates, we first examine whether the prior period spot rate change would have any effect on the forecast error and we run the following regression for each currency:
where FE t is the time t forecast error, and PSCH t is the prior spot rate change (S t-1 -S t-2 ). 2 The estimated slope for regression (6) should indicate if the forward rate forecasts are under-(positive coefficient) or over-reactions (negative coefficient) to prior changes in the spot rate.
Systematic pessimism versus optimism: The results from the above regressions, however, do not allow us to separate under-or over-reaction from optimism or pessimism in the foreign exchange markets. For example, a positive coefficient can result from under-reaction to new information or from systematically optimistic forecasts. In order to differentiate between these effects (under-or over-reaction versus optimism or pessimism), we group our observations into high, low, and medium changes of how prior changes impact forecasted changes in exchange rates:
It is possible to divide the over-reaction conditions into two further categories. Some cases of over-reaction can be re-classified as mis-reactions. Mis-reaction occurs when, in some cases, the forecast revision is excessive with respect to the two-period forecast error. This can happen when the forecast revision, the second period forecast error, and the two period forecast error are all positive or are all negative. In such cases, the forecast revision is in the wrong direction with respect to the two period forecast error, i.e., the difference between the t-2 forward rate for time t and the future spot rate for time t. As a robustness check, we estimate our main regression excluding the observations reflecting mis-reaction. Though the results are not reported in this paper, our conclusions in this paper hold and are actually strengthened when excluding the mis-reaction observations from our data.
where PredCh is the predicted change of the future spot rate defined as the t-1 F t -S t-1 , and PSCH t-1 is the prior spot rate change (S t-1 -S t-2 ). We define two dummy variables, In this regression estimate, α 3 measures the impact for the middle two quartiles while the composite coefficient α 3 +α 4 represents the impact for the lower quartile and α 3 +α 5 represents the impact for the upper quartile. If there is systematic pessimism, forecasts should over-react to lower quartile changes (have a negative coefficient) and under-react to upper quartile changes (have a positive coefficient). The opposite signs in this set of coefficients would indicate systematic optimism. Thus, this specification should allow us to assess both the under-or over-reaction effect as well as the pessimism or optimism effects.
Forecast Revisions
In addition to estimating one-period forecasts, we extend our study to include two periods and examine the effect of forecast error on the revision of traders' forecasts. Forecast revision is defined as FR t = 
C. Data
The data cover the currencies of the ten major industrialized countries, United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, and Japan. Weekly spot and 180 and 90-day forward exchange rate data for 1981-1995 for the nine currencies against the U.S. dollar are obtained from the Harries Bank Weekly Review.
4 Table 1a reports the descriptive statistics for the data set. Three weekly closing exchange series are contained in the dataset, which are the spot rate, 90-day forward rate, and the 180-day forward rate.
5 All reported rates are in U.S.D. per foreign currency unit and the descriptive statistics are provided in table 1a. This data set contains 731 observations for each currency covering 14 years (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) . Table 2 reports the results of the tests for unit roots in each of the time series including the spot rate, forward rates for 90 and 180 days, forward premium for 90 and 180 days, changes in spot rates for 90 days and 180 days, and also the forecast error and forecast revision. From table 2, we can see that, with the only exception of 90-day forward rate of the French Franc, all spot rates, forward rates, and forward premiums have unit roots in the level series and become stationary for first differences. Similarly, changes in spot rates, forecast errors and forecast revisions are also stationary.
IV. Empirical Results
A. Preliminary Analysis
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Cointegration tests of the spot and 90-day forward rate, and the spot and 180-day forward rate for each currency are in table 3. Unlike Zivot (2000), we do not find the cointegrating vector [1,-1] for about half the currencies. This finding is not unusual. As summarized in Engel (1996) , some studies find that the spot and the forward rate are cointegrated with the cointegrating factor [1,-1], other studies find they are cointegrated but the cointegrating vector is not [1,-1], and still others find they are not cointegrated.
To obtain a preliminary assessment of the relationship between the forecast error and the forecast revision, this paper examines subgroups when observations are grouped according to the signs of the forecast revisions and the signs of the forecast errors. Table 4 presents these results and reports the number of observations in each group and the percentage of each group in the total observations (707) for each currency. The over-and under-reaction columns reflect respectively the sums of the columns with different signs for FR and FE (FR<0 with FE>0 and FR>0 with FE<0) and the same signs for FR and FE (FR<0 with FE<0 and FR>0 with FE>0).
As seen in table 4, the patterns observed for the totals are also reflected in the case of each currency. The totals for positive FEs (optimism) are lower (46% versus 54%) and on average these foreign exchange markets exhibit pessimism. The totals for the over-and underreaction columns (42% versus 58%) seem to suggest that foreign exchange investors and markets tend on average to under-react to new information. Overall, these preliminary results indicate that participants in the foreign exchange markets tend to be somewhat pessimistic and generally under-react to new information.
B. Under-versus Over-Reaction
This section reports table 5, 6 and 7 results of the more formal tests designed to assess over-versus under-reaction in foreign exchange markets. Table 5 reports the results of estimating equation (6). The coefficients of PSCH t for all currencies are statistically significantly positive. Using the unexpected prior period change in exchange rates as the independent variable gives similar results also with significant positive slope coefficients. The positive slope coefficients in these regressions indicate that the forward rates do not reflect all of the expected changes, that is they under-react to information in prior changes in the spot rate. At most 1 * Note: Johansen co-integration test is applied to each currency between the spot rate and the 90-day forward rate, and between the spot rate and the 180-day forward rate. * (**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5% (1%) is PSCH t-1 minus the average change of the prior 3-month spot rate. Coefficients of independent variables are reported with t-statistics in the line below. ** indicates the significant level at 1% and * indicates the significant level at 5%. (7) where the predicted change of exchange rate PredCh is the dependent variable.
TABLE 6. Determinants of the Predicted Change in Exchange Rates
PSCH t-1 is the prior spot rate change (S 
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6. Regressions using the unexpected prior period changes show similar results and are not presented here for brevity but are available from the authors. Table 6 reports the results of the regressions for equation 7 for the impact of prior period changes on predicted exchange rate changes for all nine countries. These regressions evaluate the impact of prior changes in the extreme quartiles as well as for the two middle quartiles. As the results presented in the middle section of this table indicate, for the middle two quartiles, six of the prior change coefficients are significantly positive (the other three are not significant) indicating under-reaction and confirming the results presented in the prior table. In examining the first three columns of results in this table for the lower quartile, except for the U.K., the composite coefficients for the lower quartile are all negative (over-reaction) while the composite coefficients for the upper quartile are mostly positive (under-reaction) . This combination of coefficients indicates systematic pessimism in the reaction of the forward rate to new information for seven of the nine exchange rates examined (the signs of the coefficients only for the U.K. pound indicate optimism but they are not significant). Table 7 reports results for the regressions for equation 8 that examine forecast revisions as reflected in changes in forward rates. As may be expected, last period forecast error seems to have a large and 8. Since the pooled data set contains data for nine currencies and for 14 years, we may have a problem with time series cross-sectional cross-correlation in error terms, so we also estimate the regressions using the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) procedure to supplement our OLS results. The two sets of results are very similar and give similar results.
9. When a dummy for over-and under-reaction is introduced in the pooled regression, it is highly significant and the other coefficients remain significant. significant impact on the forecast revision since all of the coefficients are significantly positive and the R 2 s are generally high. Consistent with results in table 3, the coefficient of Fe t-1 are all positive for all nine currencies, indicating that the forward exchange rate systematically under-reacts to information. 
C. Pessimism versus Optimism
This section, and tables 8 and 9 report on the results of the more formal tests designed to assess pessimism versus optimism in foreign exchange markets. Table 8 reports the result of regressions of the pooled dataset and of the two subgroups, over-reactions and under-reactions. The null hypothesis of rationality requires both intercept and coefficient of FR be zero in the regression, while positive α implies optimism, negative α implies pessimism, positive β implies over-reaction, and negative β implies under-reaction to new information. The regression results of pooled dataset indicate that rationality is clearly rejected. 8 We find significant negative coefficients of both the intercept and FR, indicating non-rationality, pessimism, and under-reaction to new information. Table 8 also presents the results for the two subgroups, over-reaction and under-reaction. 9 Both the intercept terms are negative indicating pessimism in each case. As expected, the β coefficient is positive for the over-reaction group and negative for the under-reaction group. As expected, the regression R-squares are much higher for the split samples. Table 9 panel A reports the overall and subgroup (over-and underreaction) regression results for each currency. The results indicate that under-reaction with pessimism is a consistent pattern for all currencies and rationality is definitely rejected for all these currencies. As expected, for each currency, the coefficients for the over-reaction groups are positive while they are negative for the under-reaction groups. The intercept coefficient for each currency's under-reaction group is negative indicating pessimism uniformly. The intercept coefficients for the over-reaction groups differ somewhat with six of them being negative (pessimism) and only three (Dutch Guilder, German Mark, and Belgian Franc) being positive (optimism). Overall, these results indicate general under-reaction and pessimism in revisions.
The results presented in table 9 panel A are economically very important. Table 9 panel B reports estimates of the economic significance of the estimated alpha and beta coefficients for each currency. This panel compares estimates of FE based on the equation estimated in panel A with the FE based on assuming an alpha of zero and separately assuming a beta of zero. The top part compares these two estimates of FE using the average FR for that currency while the bottom part of this panel compares the two estimates of FE using a standard FR that is the same for all currencies. The estimates of beta are economically important as using estimated betas make important differences in estimated FEs. However, as the last column indicates, the economic importance of alpha is many times greater. Using the estimated alpha results in an estimated FE that is many multiples of the FE estimated when assuming an alpha of zero. As the variables involved are all small numbers, as are the estimated alphas, clearly the estimated alphas are both statistically significant and economically important.
V. Conclusions
The relation between spot and forward rates in the currency markets is important for many economic decisions including investing, hedging, and economic policymaking. However, this relationship remains an empirical and theoretical puzzle and there is much debate about the extent to which the forward rate is an unbiased forecast of the future spot rate.
As in recent literature on over-and under-reaction in other asset (equity) markets and in the revision behavior of economic forecasters and financial analysts, this paper assesses pessimism/optimism and under/over-reaction in revisions of forward rates as forecasts of the future spot rate for the currencies of the nine major industrialized countries. It is documented that for forward rates as forecasts of future spot rates, the rationality hypothesis is firmly rejected and revisions in forward rates as forecasts of future spot rates reflect significant systematic pessimism and systematic under-reaction to new information. These results are robust to alternative research methodologies and hold both for the pooled data set and for the nine currencies examined.
In spite of the extraordinarily high trading volumes in currency markets, these results documenting the non-rational behavior of changes in forward exchange rates are consistent with similar behavioral biases observed in other asset markets. The results presented here have important implications for policy-makers, currency overlay managers, and other investors. For example, the results documented here suggest investment strategies for extraordinary returns as investors who account for the behavioral biases reflected in forward rates can expect to achieve higher risk-adjusted returns.
